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      NT的密碼究竟放在哪

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      發(fā)表于 2011-1-12 21:01:17 | 只看該作者 |倒序?yàn)g覽 |閱讀模式
      根據(jù)以前的發(fā)現(xiàn),windowsNT密碼雖然不象Windows95那樣以簡(jiǎn)單加密形式包含在一個(gè)文件里面,而是一些雜亂的暗碼,分別藏在7個(gè)不同的地方。這篇最新發(fā)表的文章告訴我們WindowsNT密碼隱藏的第八個(gè)地方。Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:26:41 +0100' }# h0 i3 k* P" G" f& A6 @5 a
      - D) `. j4 b9 {
      From: Patrick CHAMBET <pchambet@club-internet.fr>4 x( v" D7 Y8 O3 o

      * s0 c/ B, }) q, ^* |* G5 r, mTo: sans@clark.net! ~* C- ^+ M6 v. a
      Subject: Alert: IIS 4.0 metabase can reveal plaintext passwords" V) q+ g8 u+ u2 E1 M0 J6 N; I/ @! a
      Hi all,
      6 B# ~- H3 A# t( Q- s! {: b6 LWe knew that Windows NT passwords are stored in 7 different places across" t) K( ]0 d. V$ `. J+ H
      the system. Here is a 8th place: the IIS 4.0 metabase.
      0 Z3 b( f% D# ~1 WIIS 4.0 uses its own configuration database, named "metabase", which can- Z9 [3 p) O: y. ^* N0 e) B
      be compared to the Windows Registry: the metabase is organised in Hives,- I# a1 Y8 {; F& v" S
      Keys and Values. It is stored in the following file:0 D  ^* n" G4 Y9 ]3 w* p
      C:\WINNT\system32\inetsrv\MetaBase.bin
      9 r  ]/ ]; L* x( v( BThe IIS 4.0 metabase contains these passwords:
      % D6 }( t. d0 z* L7 W# t+ a9 z- IUSR_ComputerName account password (only if you have typed it in the
      : q7 Z5 j5 `  h: y: iMMC)
      2 R+ ?% ]: Q- r! X- IWAM_ComputerName account password (ALWAYS !)
      & n' X4 F: o5 R* A- UNC username and password used to connect to another server if one of$ o$ l" A6 [! [  m. Y
      your virtual directories is located there.5 W9 p3 L- C4 C/ \8 ]/ y5 N
      - The user name and password used to connect to the ODBC DSN called
      / K  t, U, j  y( n0 V: Q"HTTPLOG" (if you chose to store your Logs into a database).
      : W; a( D! c# ?5 E6 GNote that the usernames are in unicode, clear text, that the passwords are) N8 G: [% g" s1 j; s1 v$ D
      srambled in the metabase.ini file, and that only Administrators and SYSTEM
      & j3 E: m; c( khave permissions on this file.) h4 n- G$ }, P0 ^1 A5 L
      BUT a few lines of script in a WSH script or in an ASP page allow to print" D: o: @9 |1 C0 ?' |
      these passwords in CLEAR TEXT.3 d+ A( g- U' S+ E9 N
      The user name and password used to connect to the Logs DSN could allow a" v( V  N6 f/ m6 L8 h! V- |
      malicious user to delete traces of his activities on the server.
      ; }8 s. D! u, F; x: wObviously this represents a significant risk for Web servers that allow
      ; D0 E4 U* n- Y# h/ Ulogons and/or remote access, although I did not see any exploit of the5 S7 @1 m6 R7 g. s2 o
      problem I am reporting yet. Here is an example of what can be gathered:! j" X( s" s% ]# S& z9 U" j% ~/ e# u% S
      "$ |8 f$ z5 Q" j5 P/ _/ G0 H
      IIS 4.0 Metabase7 l( _. }& a# m& |3 F, m
      ?Patrick Chambet 1998 - pchambet@club-internet.fr; Y7 e6 ]' T, h4 r
      --- UNC User ---
      1 b" U6 Z4 O2 c0 u% }" K) A8 I7 eUNC User name: 'Lou', E5 z3 m- f2 r- k9 [' U; [0 V9 D
      UNC User password: 'Microsoft'
      # d' G" G2 j; U, BUNC Authentication Pass Through: 'False'
      9 H8 c/ t% E' s# G0 |) }: h--- Anonymous User ---
      ; _/ p4 V6 T0 l' b2 T$ TAnonymous User name: 'IUSR_SERVER'
      0 J1 b( L; ?2 u6 k* MAnonymous User password: 'x1fj5h_iopNNsp'
      ) f6 [0 a7 ^. X; [! R# B) rPassword synchronization: 'False'
      ' ~8 b8 F( z0 N6 A7 `& f7 C+ ?4 N--- IIS Logs DSN User ---
      / V7 l  ~1 |; f/ r. [' u$ W4 kODBC DSN name: 'HTTPLOG'
      . R6 G/ a, H& e/ J6 N, b9 W6 _ODBC table name: 'InternetLog'; q% o# g  v# N
      ODBC User name: 'InternetAdmin'% k8 r( W. L) p5 x8 C3 a
      ODBC User password: 'xxxxxx'4 ^2 x( [8 S% a8 x% O
      --- Web Applications User ---
      0 q2 \( U  k2 i! e% w$ ^; p& LWAM User name: 'IWAM_SERVER'5 ]  T; w* v4 c* p# l
      WAM User password: 'Aj8_g2sAhjlk2'
      9 ~8 s2 v& `* F% P- F$ J8 }Default Logon Domain: ''+ C: G' B( n4 q/ n7 V8 x- {3 g- |
      "
      ) Q  ^# M) @0 X2 NFor example, you can imagine the following scenario:: {" N9 i9 ~  |  B2 K
      A user Bob is allowed to logon only on a server hosting IIS 4.0, say3 ]+ |. L: ^. K9 w7 ^
      server (a). He need not to be an Administrator. He can be for example
      ' X& u7 P' V, J: P+ f# p! jan IIS 4.0 Web Site Operator. Then, he launches a WSH script that extracts* x+ u" n+ a9 F8 {, W
      the login name and password of the account used to access to a virtual
      ' S) H& t, h9 r% O5 o' Qdirectory located on another server, say (b).  C1 B6 g, H4 x. r( P
      Now, Bob can use these login name and passord to logon on server (b).0 w3 _+ j8 T& d0 k
      And so forth...
      5 _& k. z0 a' f1 E* i6 XMicrosoft was informed of this vulnerability.
      ( g$ w  {$ ]% l2 v_______________________________________________________________________- ^, B$ r) q% E1 y! @1 V9 S2 J9 f+ M
      Patrick CHAMBET - pchambet@club-internet.fr
      8 @; a7 g5 I, ^$ G4 d6 P' CMCP NT 4.0
      * A- M5 m& y; j+ i& B5 _. hInternet, Security and Microsoft solutions
      " L+ T+ c3 Z  b: pe-business Services3 P" ?- d4 ]9 |5 n( e0 b
      IBM Global Services& U7 a- x% b) ]: e
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