根據(jù)以前的發(fā)現(xiàn),windowsNT密碼雖然不象Windows95那樣以簡(jiǎn)單加密形式包含在一個(gè)文件里面,而是一些雜亂的暗碼,分別藏在7個(gè)不同的地方。這篇最新發(fā)表的文章告訴我們WindowsNT密碼隱藏的第八個(gè)地方。Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:26:41 +0100
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From: Patrick CHAMBET <pchambet@club-internet.fr>; j* T& g/ S2 A; E
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To: sans@clark.net
; g' H j: X$ \! H$ F! WSubject: Alert: IIS 4.0 metabase can reveal plaintext passwords" B3 g5 b: P; r! x; [
Hi all,
0 `! A0 X+ w w: ~# f' QWe knew that Windows NT passwords are stored in 7 different places across! ~( a! i% @7 \& T, [. y+ `0 O' _
the system. Here is a 8th place: the IIS 4.0 metabase.
4 ~/ R. i0 V! n5 y2 AIIS 4.0 uses its own configuration database, named "metabase", which can0 x- {, n4 d0 R1 s* ?
be compared to the Windows Registry: the metabase is organised in Hives,- g. H' `- W) K0 L& {( S$ C. O9 E$ f
Keys and Values. It is stored in the following file:
/ ~0 P& `% h8 OC:\WINNT\system32\inetsrv\MetaBase.bin
# b, W: {) Y# D( ?3 B8 RThe IIS 4.0 metabase contains these passwords:4 S8 {& ?/ Y: F: C. |
- IUSR_ComputerName account password (only if you have typed it in the8 ]; Q$ W, A; R: M+ ^% J
MMC)
" F8 T P0 I& P# X: \' E1 x- IWAM_ComputerName account password (ALWAYS !): v2 P) B$ ]6 M6 V+ O
- UNC username and password used to connect to another server if one of/ J$ J* G2 g& d7 B0 s8 s$ E
your virtual directories is located there.
" k2 k7 Y8 s7 s- The user name and password used to connect to the ODBC DSN called
/ f! g. B9 |/ ~+ t1 e4 P) L"HTTPLOG" (if you chose to store your Logs into a database).7 F2 o ?" p2 y2 ]7 q, {6 b3 p0 J
Note that the usernames are in unicode, clear text, that the passwords are
c& U+ e$ A6 ?6 p$ N% ssrambled in the metabase.ini file, and that only Administrators and SYSTEM
) a4 C- g- x1 bhave permissions on this file.3 S3 `1 d$ V I
BUT a few lines of script in a WSH script or in an ASP page allow to print
* Z5 Y: ?5 b& q1 G' o8 v# dthese passwords in CLEAR TEXT.
. a# @7 z2 R1 {) jThe user name and password used to connect to the Logs DSN could allow a. ~ ]1 [0 d- | [+ j. S) W
malicious user to delete traces of his activities on the server.; w0 j& P7 a) z- x
Obviously this represents a significant risk for Web servers that allow5 I# q% P! Q2 M
logons and/or remote access, although I did not see any exploit of the
1 N+ T8 d' F; j& H. w& ?( Uproblem I am reporting yet. Here is an example of what can be gathered:: A# O3 P. \. e
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IIS 4.0 Metabase
! ?4 `- X1 B1 o7 z?Patrick Chambet 1998 - pchambet@club-internet.fr& v- A) M9 T& v2 G% m
--- UNC User ---
& D9 K# c5 @ ]& JUNC User name: 'Lou'4 h' ?1 }- i4 G
UNC User password: 'Microsoft'
& }1 Z. M3 q* w, M) `3 r9 M% Q8 K4 LUNC Authentication Pass Through: 'False'/ T" \$ u& J$ A! T0 T
--- Anonymous User ---& t2 o. V+ @3 u/ q0 g
Anonymous User name: 'IUSR_SERVER'
6 l4 w( c! T6 j3 i! `1 WAnonymous User password: 'x1fj5h_iopNNsp'/ `& q& V" ~! S
Password synchronization: 'False'2 k3 W0 e4 U; {" E/ T+ ^
--- IIS Logs DSN User ---/ X# _8 R) y ]! d1 v! h2 O: {9 A
ODBC DSN name: 'HTTPLOG'% W- b% B. Q% O4 s' E7 v! {' X
ODBC table name: 'InternetLog'
: {! d3 e8 m) k7 {$ CODBC User name: 'InternetAdmin': o) G! C" M; k+ t- }! D8 A
ODBC User password: 'xxxxxx'
M! W1 s# \- D' B. `7 J--- Web Applications User ---0 O7 b K* I$ A7 D" x
WAM User name: 'IWAM_SERVER'- ] m8 N( R- Q4 g+ Z) K" t
WAM User password: 'Aj8_g2sAhjlk2'
. r' }/ y$ [3 Q, N! [5 ODefault Logon Domain: '', b5 D8 I! b! p9 t: A2 T3 i
"
3 \6 }! o3 ?4 t9 x5 ]For example, you can imagine the following scenario:
' ^. N" S" |, ]2 m$ O( P: A/ BA user Bob is allowed to logon only on a server hosting IIS 4.0, say- H$ }# r* b f' W9 s n- L
server (a). He need not to be an Administrator. He can be for example
" Q1 ^6 F. Q* ?) J9 Aan IIS 4.0 Web Site Operator. Then, he launches a WSH script that extracts) w3 N5 d$ X' o. d( O
the login name and password of the account used to access to a virtual
2 W- p* c* a% h P$ ?1 Kdirectory located on another server, say (b)." e' U+ z s3 Q+ ]
Now, Bob can use these login name and passord to logon on server (b).
2 ?8 j/ j& f& @! a- LAnd so forth...
. o8 p3 ]& M2 P7 JMicrosoft was informed of this vulnerability.3 C! j1 R6 y5 ^% J
_______________________________________________________________________" X; \, }, C, e" m- X) d( ?% G
Patrick CHAMBET - pchambet@club-internet.fr3 o$ M$ |0 G1 e7 P3 o% W
MCP NT 4.0# j9 ^3 L, E" p* V! n
Internet, Security and Microsoft solutions4 I$ i! ?& U, V- r4 ]
e-business Services1 |4 i4 {: }3 t8 j, Q ]$ k# U
IBM Global Services+ d+ S. p0 L1 b( l- e2 E
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