亚洲色一色噜一噜噜噜_在线国产精品一区二区_91国自产拍 精品_国产伦三级一区二区

  • <object id="nlumt"><tt id="nlumt"><pre id="nlumt"></pre></tt></object>
    <legend id="nlumt"><mark id="nlumt"></mark></legend>
    <pre id="nlumt"><tt id="nlumt"><rt id="nlumt"></rt></tt></pre>

    <bdo id="nlumt"><delect id="nlumt"></delect></bdo>

      汶上信息港

      標(biāo)題: NT的密碼究竟放在哪 [打印本頁]

      作者: 雜七雜八    時(shí)間: 2011-1-12 21:01
      標(biāo)題: NT的密碼究竟放在哪
      根據(jù)以前的發(fā)現(xiàn),windowsNT密碼雖然不象Windows95那樣以簡單加密形式包含在一個(gè)文件里面,而是一些雜亂的暗碼,分別藏在7個(gè)不同的地方。這篇最新發(fā)表的文章告訴我們WindowsNT密碼隱藏的第八個(gè)地方。Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:26:41 +0100
      ( C2 y6 m7 n0 h" ^3 V  [$ _& v3 f3 E* k' N' F* J2 @2 U
      From: Patrick CHAMBET <pchambet@club-internet.fr>
      % |- O/ i) g. z5 U
      ( \$ V& E; i+ B8 V! KTo: sans@clark.net# ~0 J, J% w& Y8 c
      Subject: Alert: IIS 4.0 metabase can reveal plaintext passwords
      ; H% G6 @2 C8 o" M  MHi all,
      9 G$ B& b! f/ P7 ~1 M1 O* O" v, qWe knew that Windows NT passwords are stored in 7 different places across
      # p, ^4 W5 a" Fthe system. Here is a 8th place: the IIS 4.0 metabase.& U/ h0 I; x' ]& d; R, P
      IIS 4.0 uses its own configuration database, named "metabase", which can
      ! ]* Q, b) d5 f% C" W  Z+ Gbe compared to the Windows Registry: the metabase is organised in Hives,
      : i: e* O6 j4 k: X. LKeys and Values. It is stored in the following file:
      ' j/ ?- T- R- b+ N& FC:\WINNT\system32\inetsrv\MetaBase.bin
      . Q% B* c/ G* L! n5 n  x1 NThe IIS 4.0 metabase contains these passwords:
      : W& T6 A. D, l5 A- IUSR_ComputerName account password (only if you have typed it in the9 h+ m: C; z9 p
      MMC)
      4 w4 G/ u1 i+ ^- IWAM_ComputerName account password (ALWAYS !)
      ) ~' c6 b( U  \. K) a. f- UNC username and password used to connect to another server if one of
      * A4 @# C  i( ?3 `; yyour virtual directories is located there.
      : W& P8 i4 m. o$ C" S- The user name and password used to connect to the ODBC DSN called
      6 ?0 L( C; K) w, l5 T0 C"HTTPLOG" (if you chose to store your Logs into a database).
      % \0 L5 B, @! Y: C, \5 ?9 @, FNote that the usernames are in unicode, clear text, that the passwords are
      1 C1 e2 g' V! H, x% o& u  ^srambled in the metabase.ini file, and that only Administrators and SYSTEM; ?. `0 V  H1 o. p7 r  t. y: B
      have permissions on this file.) @7 l. N$ t2 P/ T0 I
      BUT a few lines of script in a WSH script or in an ASP page allow to print
      ' i7 \) b9 m) B6 E- U9 P. I: Pthese passwords in CLEAR TEXT.0 I2 o! J# @9 \. \4 V$ M
      The user name and password used to connect to the Logs DSN could allow a8 C9 d9 u$ k3 X  k. }( `& N
      malicious user to delete traces of his activities on the server.# _  ^8 O* `+ I, c4 X
      Obviously this represents a significant risk for Web servers that allow
      8 N% Y' c" n( ~. Alogons and/or remote access, although I did not see any exploit of the# b: l; K: A3 I7 D) b
      problem I am reporting yet. Here is an example of what can be gathered:: _) W* G9 P3 a* |" P6 T
      "
      ' w6 i4 m7 f5 G4 i8 u( zIIS 4.0 Metabase
      $ S, \) j  X+ q8 ~/ I$ C5 O?Patrick Chambet 1998 - pchambet@club-internet.fr
      ' [0 e2 d' [& i1 |--- UNC User ---: A2 x0 l. M' a9 `0 H! F
      UNC User name: 'Lou'
      - `3 r, o3 X) Z) iUNC User password: 'Microsoft'
      9 A! d$ z* M1 FUNC Authentication Pass Through: 'False'; g. R$ q$ Y( {( l$ A1 N
      --- Anonymous User ---
      + j4 U& g7 {% s& t. f2 n3 qAnonymous User name: 'IUSR_SERVER'. A* B" @: X2 n8 h
      Anonymous User password: 'x1fj5h_iopNNsp'
      - L8 J, u& {( j8 c! qPassword synchronization: 'False'
      : I( S, V' k( n! W4 q--- IIS Logs DSN User ---( M( x  q) g4 y- i/ K. P7 y3 c' k
      ODBC DSN name: 'HTTPLOG'
      + i4 ]! x/ p& }8 E1 J" ~, JODBC table name: 'InternetLog'! s$ Q* R# I  e, C, s* k! i
      ODBC User name: 'InternetAdmin'
      . [3 w5 n5 u' vODBC User password: 'xxxxxx'
      $ h  d% X6 l. F4 l$ Y7 b. }# N% @0 O--- Web Applications User ---
      ' i! D( ]7 {% b! U+ gWAM User name: 'IWAM_SERVER'
      ! l; k% c& V* K1 C" QWAM User password: 'Aj8_g2sAhjlk2'' a( r0 j% v  x
      Default Logon Domain: ''8 c3 `. c' x! d8 U' D, l# {
      "! T; R  g/ p0 @0 D
      For example, you can imagine the following scenario:6 d/ Q/ C+ f- p+ t- J: q1 U2 A& u
      A user Bob is allowed to logon only on a server hosting IIS 4.0, say
      2 t, K, t2 [9 _( Nserver (a). He need not to be an Administrator. He can be for example
      0 ^& w# |% A: Nan IIS 4.0 Web Site Operator. Then, he launches a WSH script that extracts! S' y5 v$ c5 X1 \$ A% Q, N# I
      the login name and password of the account used to access to a virtual
      . x0 d. d9 Y: C7 Y8 cdirectory located on another server, say (b).
      ' E* n: D4 v: q) `) a" M. |! S  ENow, Bob can use these login name and passord to logon on server (b).* Y: F  ~# E9 ?1 A8 h: j1 e
      And so forth...
      ( I. X. Z7 I2 R$ U/ W  XMicrosoft was informed of this vulnerability.
      % e& h: H6 W; s  L) N_______________________________________________________________________# R: m, Q  w6 D1 p, w& Q
      Patrick CHAMBET - pchambet@club-internet.fr* ?8 s+ ]! m. p, Z* ?6 Z( H# V4 k
      MCP NT 4.0
      ) @3 p# {! c  v4 N- z0 E& S( MInternet, Security and Microsoft solutions
      2 T: _+ o) J) U1 F: le-business Services/ K& C# I, ~8 U5 V; }. ]# t
      IBM Global Services0 g& V; ]$ i, ]7 g7 y: L2 y, @





      歡迎光臨 汶上信息港 (http://www.loveproblemguru.com/) Powered by Discuz! X3.5